

The 3d paragraph of the 2d sect. of art. I. Bill under consideration.

Hon. Mr. Dilton opened the conversation with some remarks on Mr. Randall's positive assertions the day before, "that the land in general in the Southern States, was preferable to any he ever saw." From his own observation, and accounts he had seen which were better, he could say that the gentleman's remarks were not perfectly accurate—the hon. gentleman shewed why it was not so, by stating the inconsiderable product of the land, which, though it might in part be owing to the selfishness and ignorance of the slaves who cultivate it, he said, was in a great measure owing to the want of heart in the soil.

Mr. Randall. Mr. President, I rise to make an observation on the suggestion of the hon. gentleman from Newbury. I have, sir, travelled into the Southern States, & should be glad to compare our knowledge on the subject together. In Carolina, Mr. President, if they don't get more than 20 or 30 bushels of corn to an acre, they sometimes get 40. I hope, sir, these great men of eloquence and learning will not try to make arguments to make; this constitution go down, right or wrong. An old saying, sir, is, that a good thing don't need praising; but, sir, it takes the best men in the State to give this constitution, which they say is the best that human wisdom can invent. In praise of it, we hear the Rev. Clergy, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the ablest Lawyers, exerting their utmost abilities. Now, sir, suppose all this artillery turned the other way, and these great men would speak out as much against it, we might compare our business and go home in 48 hours. Let us, sir, consider, we are acting for the people, and for ages unborn; let us deal fairly and above-board. Every one comes here to discharge his duty to his constituents, and I hope none will be biased by the benefactors; because we are not acting for ourselves. I think Congress ought to have power, such as is for the good of the nation, but what it is, let a more able man than I tell us.

Mr. Dawes said, he was sorry to hear so many objections raised against the paragraph under consideration. He thought them wholly unfounded: that the back inhabitants of the Southern States, must be considered either as slaves, and as so much property, or in the character of so many freemen; if the former, why should they not be wholly represented? Our own State laws and constitution would lead us to consider these blacks as freemen, and so indeed would our own ideas of natural justice: if then they are freemen, they might form an equal basis for representation as though they were all white inhabitants. In either view, therefore, he could not see that the Northern States would suffer, but directly the contrary. He thought, however, that gentlemen would do well to connect the passage in dispute with another article in the constitution, that permits Congress, in the year 1793, wholly to prohibit the importation of slaves, and in the mean time to impose a duty of ten dollars a head on such blacks as should be imported before that period. Besides, by the new constitution, every particular State is left to its own option totally to prohibit the introduction of slaves into its own territory. What could the Congress do more? The members of the Southern States, are not without their prejudices. It would do no good to abolish slavery, if a part of Congress, in a moment, and to destroy the flow that our Southern brethren consider as property. But we may say, that although slavery is not inalienable, yet it has received a moral wound & will die of a consumption.

Mr. D. said that the paragraph in debate related only to the rule of apportioning internal taxes; but gentlemen had gone into a consideration of the question, whether Congress should have the power of laying and collecting such taxes, which he thought would be more properly discussed under the section relative to the powers of Congress: But as objections had been suggested, the answers might be hinted at we went along. By the old articles, said he, Congress have a right to ascertain what sums are necessary for the union, and to appropriate the same; but have no authority to draw such monies from the States. The States are under an honorary obligation to raise the monies; but Congress cannot compel a compliance with the obligation. Let us contemplate the loan we have negotiated with the Dutch, our ambassador has bound us all jointly and severally to pay the money borrowed. When pay day shall come, how is the money to be raised? Congress cannot collect it. If any one State shall disobey a requisition, the Dutch are left in such a dilemma to put their own demand in force for themselves. They must raise by arms what we are afraid Congress shall collect by the law of peace. There is a prejudice, said Mr. Dawes, against direct taxation, which arises from the manner in which it has been abused by the errors of the old confederation. Congress has it not in their power to draw a revenue from commerce, and therefore multiplied their requisitions on the States. Massachusetts, willing to pay her part,

made her own trade law; on which the trade depended to such of our neighbours as made no such impositions on commerce: Thus we lost what little revenue we had, and out only recourse was to a direct taxation. In addition to this, foreign nations knowing this inability of Congress, have on that account been backward in their negotiations, and have lent us money at a premium which bore more proportion to the risk they had of getting payment; and this extraordinary expense has fallen at last on the land. Some gentlemen have said, that Congress may draw their revenue wholly by direct taxes; but they cannot be induced to do so; it is easier for them to have resort to the impost and excise: But as it will not do to overburden the impost (because that would promote smuggling and be dangerous to the revenue) therefore Congress should have the power of applying, in extraordinary cases, to direct taxation. War may take place, in which case it would not be proper to alter those appropriations of impost which may be made for peace establishments—it is expedient to direct the public funds—the power of direct taxation would in such circumstances be a necessary power. As to the rule of apportioning such taxes, it must be by the quantity of land, or else in the manner laid down in the paragraph under debate. But the quantity of land, is an uncertain rule of wealth—Compare the lands of different nations of Europe; some of them have great comparative wealth and less quantity of lands, while others have more lands and less wealth—compare Holland with Germany. The rule laid down in the paragraph is the best that can be obtained for the apportionment of the little direct taxes which Congress will want.

P. M.  
The 3d paragraph still under debate.  
Messrs. King, Gore, Parsons, and Jones (of Bolton) spoke of the justice in general, and supposed advantage to the Northern States in particular, of the rule of apportionment in this paragraph, to that in the confederation; and also followed. Judge Dana, a sketch of whose speech

The learned Judge began by answering some objections to this paragraph—and urging the necessity of Congress being vested with power to levy direct taxes on the States; and it was not to be supposed that they would levy such, unless the impost and excise should be found insufficient, in case of a war. If, says he, a part of the Union is attacked by a foreign enemy, and we are distinguished, how is it to defend itself? Can it by its own internal force? In the late war, this State singly was attacked; and obliged to make the first defence—What has happened may happen again. The State, oppressed, must exert its whole power, and bear the whole charge of the defence: but common danger points out for common exertion—and this constitution is excellently designed to make the danger equal. Why should one State expend its blood and treasure for the whole? Ought not a controlling authority to exist, to call forth, if necessary, the whole force and wealth of all the States?—If diminished, the time may come when we may be attacked by our natural enemies—Nova Scotia and New-Brunswick, filled with Tories and refugees, stand ready to attack and devour these States, one by one. This will be the case, if we have no power to draw forth the wealth and strength of the whole, for the defence of a part. These, shall we, continues the hon. gentleman, say, but too true, continues the hon. gentleman, valued somewhat; that could command that wealth and strength which we wanted. I speak with earnestness, said he, but it is for the good of my native country. By God and man made equal, it is with remorse I have heard it suggested, that those gentlemen who have had the superior advantages of education, were enemies to the rights of their country: Are there any among this hon. body, who are possessed of minds capable of such narrow prejudices? If there are, it is in vain to reason with them—we had better come to a decision and go home.—After dilating on this matter a short time, the learned Judge begged gentlemen to look around them, and see who were the men who composed the assembly.—Are they not, he asked, men who have been foremost in the cause of their country, both in the cabinet and the field, and who with halberd about their necks boldly and intrepidly advocated the rights of America, and of humanity, at home and in foreign countries? and are they not to be trusted? Direct taxation is a tremendous idea—but may not necessity dictate it to be unavoidable. We all wish to invest Congress with more power—we disagree only in the quantum, and manner in which Congress shall levy taxes on the States.—A capitation tax is abhorrent to the feelings of human nature—and I venture to trust will never be adopted by Congress. The learned judge pointed out, on various grounds the utility of the power to be vested by the Congress, and concluded, by observing, that the proposed constitution was the best that could be framed;—that if adopted we shall be a great and happy nation—rejected a weak and despised one: we shall fall as the nations of ancient times have fallen;—that this was his firm belief; and, says he, I

would rather be annihilated than give my name for or sign my name to a constitution, which, in the least, should betray the liberties or interests of my country.  
Mr. Wedgery. I hope, sir, the hon. gentleman will not think hard of it, if we ignore must bear with the infirmities of the weak; it must be a weak mind indeed that could think such illiberal reflections against gentlemen of education, as the hon. gentleman complains of. To return to the par.—If Congress, continuing Mr. W. have this power of taxing directly, will be in their power to direct a poll tax—by this method make the poor pay as much as the rich.

Mr. Dench was at a loss to know how Congress could levy the tax, in which he thought the difficulty of many confided, yet had no doubt that Congress would direct that these States should pay in their own way.  
Hon. Mr. Fuller begged to ask Mr. Garry why, in the last requisition of Congress, the portion required of this State, was thirteen times as much as of Georgia, and yet we have eight representatives in the general government, and Georgia has three?—Until this question was answered, he was at a loss to know how taxation and representation went hand in hand. Mr. Garry then voted, that this question be left on the manager in which his answer should be given.—it was at last voted that Mr. G. reduce his answer to writing.

Saturday, January 19, 1788. A. M.  
The hon. Mr. Singletary that we were giving up all our privileges; as there was no provision that men in power should have any religion, and though he hoped to see Christianity in the Constitution, a Papist, or an Infidel, was as eligible as they; it had been said that men had not degenerated.—He did not think men were better now than when men after God's own heart did wickedly. He thought in the instance, we were giving great power to wicked men.  
Gen. Brooks. (Medford) If good men are appointed, government will be administered well. But what will prevent bad men from mischief is the question.—If there should be such in the Senate—we ought to be cautious of giving power; but when that power is given with proper checks, the danger is at an end.—When men are answerable and within the reach of responsibility, they cannot forget their political life depends upon their good behaviour. The Senate frame no law but by consent of the representatives—and is answerable to that house for its conduct.—If their conduct excites suspicion, they are to be impeached—punished for prevented from holding any office, which is a great punishment. If these checks are not sufficient, it is impossible to devise such as will be so.

(Mr. Garry's answer to Mr. Fuller's question, who read, the purport is, that Gen. G. has increased in his numbers by migration—and if it had not been, would soon be entitled to the proportion assigned her.)  
Honourable Mr. King. It so happened that I was both of the convention and Congress at the same time, and if I recollect right the answer of Mr. G. does not materially vary.—In 1778, Congress required the States to make a return of the houses and lands surveyed—but one State only complied therewith, New-Hampshire. Messrs. chaffets did not. Congress consulted no rule: it was resolved that the several States should be taxed according to their ability, and if it appeared that any State had paid more than her just quota it should be paid to the credit of that State, with lawful interest.

Mr. Dalton said he had obtained a great deal by the new constitution.—By the confederation each State had an equal voice—Georgia is now shut out.  
Col. Jones, (Bristol) objected to the length of time.—If men continue in office four or six years they would forget their dependence on the people, and be loth to leave their places;—men elevated to high in power, they would fall heavy when they came down.  
Mr. Ames observed, that an objection was made against the constitution, because the Senators are to be chosen for six years, it has been said, that they will be removed too far from the control of the people, and that, to keep them in proper dependence, they should be chosen annually. It is necessary to premise, that no argument against the new plan has made a deeper impression than this, that it will produce a consolidation of the States. This is an effect which all good men will deprecate. For it is obvious, that if the State powers are to be destroyed, the representation is too small. The trust in that case would be too great to be confided to so few persons. The objects of legislation would be multiplied and complicated, that the government would be unwieldy and impracticable. The State governments are essential parts of the system, and the defence of this article is drawn from its tendency to their preservation.  
The Senators represent the sovereignty of the

States; in the other house, individuals are represented. The Senate may not originate bills, it need not be said, that they are, principally to direct the affairs of war and treaties. They are in the quality of ambassadors of the States, and it will not be denied that some permanency in their office is necessary to a discharge of their duty.—Now, if they were chosen yearly, how could they perform their trust? If they could be brought by that means more immediately under the influence of the people, then they will represent the State legislatures less, and become the representatives of individuals. This belongs to the other house. The absurdity of this, and the repugnancy to the federal principles of the constitution, will appear more fully, by supposing that they are to be chosen by the people at large. If there is any force in the objection to this article, this would be proper. Suppose then in that case the States by the people. The legislatures of the States by the people. This would totally obliterate the federal features of the constitution. What would become of the State governments, and on whom would devolve the duty of defending them against the encroachment of the federal government? A consolidation of the States would ensue, which, it is conceded, would subvert the new constitution, & again which this very article, so much condemned, is our best security. Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation. The State governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are the safe guard, and ornament of the constitution; they will protect the period of our liberties; they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights.

A very effectual check upon the power of the Senate is provided. A third part is to retire from office every two years. By this means, while the Senators are seated for six years, they are admonished of their responsibility to the State legislatures.—If one third new members are introduced, who feel the sentiments of their States, they will awe that third, whose term will be near expiring. This article seems to bear evidence of the constitution; and affords just grounds to believe, that it will be in practice as in theory, a federal republic.  
P. M.  
The 3d sect. respecting the construction of the Senate, being under debate.  
Col. Jones said, his objections still remained; the Senators chosen for so long a time will forget their duty to their constituents.—We cannot, says he, recall them.—The choice of representatives was too long—the Senate was much worse—it is a bad precedent—and it is unconstitutional.

Mr. King said, as the Senate preserved the equality of the States—their appointment is equal.—An objection to this branch is, that it is chosen for too long a period: But if the principle of classing the Senate is considered, although it appears long, will not be found so long as it appears—one class is to serve two years, another four years, and another six.—The average therefore is four years. The Senators, said Mr. K. will have a powerful check on their own conduct for their seats, who will watch their whole conduct in the general government—they will give the alarm in case of misbehaviour.—And the State legislature, if they find them erring, will instruct their delegates.—will not this be a check? When they hear the voice of the people solemnly dictating to them their duty, they will be bold men indeed to act contrary to it. They will not be instructions sent them in a private letter, which they can put in their pockets—they will be public instructions, which all the country will see, and they will be hardy men indeed to violate them.—The hon. gentleman said, the power to control the Senate, is such as never was enjoyed in any government before; and that therefore they could not be chosen for too long a time. They are, says he, to assist the executive in the designation and appointment of officers; and they ought to have time to mature their judgment; if for a short time, how can they be acquainted with the rights and interests of nations, so as to form advantageous treaties? To understand these rights is the business of education.—Their business being naturally different, they ought to have different qualifications; and their duration is not too long for a right discharge of their duty.

Dr. Taylor said, he hoped the hon. gentleman did not attempt to deceive us, by saying, that the Senate are not chosen for six years—because they are really to be chosen for six years—and as to the idea of classing, he did not know who, when chosen for that time, would go out at a shorter time. He remarked on Mr. King's idea of checks—and observed, that such indeed were in the article of confederation, which provides for delegates being chosen annually—for rotation, and the right of recalling.—But in this, they are to be chosen for six years—but a shadow of rotation provided for—and no power to recall; and concluded by saying, that if they are once chosen they are chosen for ever.

The Hon. Mr. Strong mentioned the difficulty which attended the construction of the Senate by the Convention—and that a committee, consisting of one delegate from each State, was chosen to consider the subject.—Mr. Gerry reported as it now stands—and that Mr. Gerry was on the committee from Massachusetts.  
Mr. Gerry rose, and informed the President, that he was preparing a letter on the subject in debate; which would set the matter in its true light—and which he wished to communicate; this occasioned considerable conversation, which lasted until the Convention adjourned.  
Monday, January 21st, A. M.  
4th sect. considered in its order.  
Mr. Ames, rose to answer several objections. He would forbear if possible to go over the same ground which had been already well trodden. The fourth sect. had been, he said, well discussed, and he did not mean to offer any formal argument, or new observations upon it.—It had been said, the power of regulating elections was given to Congress.—He asked if a motion was brought forward in Congress on that particular, whether the State to its own inconvenience—subjecting it to be probable such a motion could obtain? It had been also said, that our federal legislature would endeavour to perpetuate themselves in office—and that the love of power was predominant.—Mr. Ames asked how the gentlemen prevailed on themselves to trust the State legislature. He thought it was from a degree of confidence, that was placed in them. At present we trust Congress with power—may we trust the representatives of Rhode-Island and Georgia—he thought it was better to trust a general government, than a sovereign State. Mr. A. acknowledged he came with doubts of the fourth sect. Had his objections remained, he would have been obliged to vote against the Constitution: But now he thought if all the Constitution was as clear as this sect. it would meet with little opposition.  
Judge Dana. This sect. Mr. President, has been subject to much dispute and difficulty. I did not come here, determined to vote for every paragraph of this Constitution.—I supposed this clause dangerous.—It has been amply discussed—and now I am convinced, that this paragraph is much better as it stands than with the amendment, which is, that Congress be restricted in the appointing of time, place, &c. unless when the State legislature refuse to make them. I have altered my opinion on this point.—there are two reasons:—It is apparent the intention of the Convention was to let Congress act in a different ground that a part should proceed directly from the people, and not from their substitutes the legislature: Therefore the legislature ought not to control the elections. The legislature of Rhode-Island has lately formed a plan, to alter their representation to corporations, which ought to be by numbers. Look at Great Britain, where the injustice of this mode is apparent; Eight tenths of the people there, have no voice in the elections—a burrough of but two or three cottages, has a right to send two representatives to Parliament, while Birmingham, a large and populous manufacturing town lately sprung up, cannot send one. The legislature of Rhode-Island are about adopting this plan.—In order to deprive the towns of Newport and Providence, of their weight; and that thereby the legislature may have a power to counteract the will of the majority of the people.  
Mr. Cooley, (Amherst) thought Congress in the present instance, would from the powers granted by the constitution, have authority to control the elections, and thereby endanger liberty.

Mr. Taylor, rose to ask the Gentlemen from New-Burgh, whether the two branches of Congress could not agree to play into each other's hands—and, by making the qualifications of electors equal, by their power of regulating elections, fix the matter of elections, so as to keep them self free.  
Hon. Mr. King rose to pursue the enquiry why the place and manner, of holding elections, were omitted in the sect. under debate. It was to be observed, he said, that in the Constitution of Massachusetts, and other States, that the manner and place of elections were provided for the manner was by ballot, and the places towns; for, said he, we happened to settle originally in townships. But it is different in the Southern States; it would mention an instance in Virginia, there were not so many towns, and so no counties. Therefore no rule could be adopted to apply to the whole. If it was practicable, he said, it would be necessary to have a district the fixed place—but this is liable to exception—was a district may now be fully settled, and the time be yearly inhabited—and the back country now scarcely inhabited, may be fully settled.—Suppose this State may be thrown into eight districts—and a member appointed to each: If the numbers increase, the representation will differ, and will be in fact, the matter, therefore, must be left subject to the regulation of the State legislature, or the general government.—Suppose the State legislature, the circumstances will be the same. It is truly said, that our representatives are but a part of the nation—and that they may be trusted to the control of the rest; but our representatives make a ninth part of the whole—and if any authority is vested in Congress, it must be in our favour. But to the subject.—In Connecticut they do not choose by numbers, but by corporations.—Hartford, one of their largest towns, sends to more delegates than one of their smallest corporations—each town sends two, except lately when a town was divided.—The same rule is about to be adopted in Rhode-Island.—The inequality of such representation, when every representation would have an equal right to send an equal number of representatives, was apparent. In the Southern States the inequality is greater.—By the confederation of South Carolina, the city of Charleston has eighteen seats for representatives to the general assembly, and the number of white inhabitants is less.—The back parts of Carolina have increased greatly since the adoption of their constitution, and have frequent-

sting of one delegate from each State, was chosen to consider the subject.—Mr. Gerry reported as it now stands—and that Mr. Gerry was on the committee from Massachusetts.  
Mr. Gerry rose, and informed the President, that he was preparing a letter on the subject in debate; which would set the matter in its true light—and which he wished to communicate; this occasioned considerable conversation, which lasted until the Convention adjourned.  
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sting of one delegate from each State, was chosen to consider the subject.—Mr. Gerry reported as it now stands—and that Mr. Gerry was on the committee from Massachusetts.  
Mr. Gerry rose, and informed the President, that he was preparing a letter on the subject in debate; which would set the matter in its true light—and which he wished to communicate; this occasioned considerable conversation, which lasted until the Convention adjourned.  
Monday, January 21st, A. M.  
4th sect. considered in its order.  
Mr. Ames, rose to answer several objections. He would forbear if possible to go over the same ground which had been already well trodden. The fourth sect. had been, he said, well discussed, and he did not mean to offer any formal argument, or new observations upon it.—It had been said, the power of regulating elections was given to Congress.—He asked if a motion was brought forward in Congress on that particular, whether the State to its own inconvenience—subjecting it to be probable such a motion could obtain? It had been also said, that our federal legislature would endeavour to perpetuate themselves in office—and that the love of power was predominant.—Mr. Ames asked how the gentlemen prevailed on themselves to trust the State legislature. He thought it was from a degree of confidence, that was placed in them. At present we trust Congress with power—may we trust the representatives of Rhode-Island and Georgia—he thought it was better to trust a general government, than a sovereign State. Mr. A. acknowledged he came with doubts of the fourth sect. Had his objections remained, he would have been obliged to vote against the Constitution: But now he thought if all the Constitution was as clear as this sect. it would meet with little opposition.  
Judge Dana. This sect. Mr. President, has been subject to much dispute and difficulty. I did not come here, determined to vote for every paragraph of this Constitution.—I supposed this clause dangerous.—It has been amply discussed—and now I am convinced, that this paragraph is much better as it stands than with the amendment, which is, that Congress be restricted in the appointing of time, place, &c. unless when the State legislature refuse to make them. I have altered my opinion on this point.—there are two reasons:—It is apparent the intention of the Convention was to let Congress act in a different ground that a part should proceed directly from the people, and not from their substitutes the legislature: Therefore the legislature ought not to control the elections. The legislature of Rhode-Island has lately formed a plan, to alter their representation to corporations, which ought to be by numbers. Look at Great Britain, where the injustice of this mode is apparent; Eight tenths of the people there, have no voice in the elections—a burrough of but two or three cottages, has a right to send two representatives to Parliament, while Birmingham, a large and populous manufacturing town lately sprung up, cannot send one. The legislature of Rhode-Island are about adopting this plan.—In order to deprive the towns of Newport and Providence, of their weight; and that thereby the legislature may have a power to counteract the will of the majority of the people.  
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It attempted an alteration of this unequal mode of representation; but the members from Carolina, by giving the balance to much in their favour, will not consent to an alteration; and we see that the delegates from Carolina in Congress, have always been chosen from the delegates of that City. The representatives, therefore, from that State, will not be chosen by the people; they will be the representatives of a faction of that State. If the general government cannot consent to this case, how are the proposals of the Hon. gentleman from Massachusetts, laid before us, who would send us to the States, to be of controlling given by this sect, extend to the manner of election, and the qualifications of the electors. The qualifications are age and residence—and none can be preferable. (Adjourned.)  
(To be continued.)

B O S T O N, Jan. 21.  
We are happy to inform the public, that his Excellency JOHN HANCOCK, Esq. President of the Convention, has so far recovered his health, as to be able to give his attendance at that honourable Body.

The General Assembly of New-York, we hear, have resolved that a Convention be called, for the purpose of settling to, and raising the Federal Constitution, to meet at an early day.  
N O R T H A M P T O N, February 6.  
Extract of a letter from the boy of Honduras, dated Sept. 29, 1787.  
"A fever and violent hurrucane came on here the 2d of this month, in the morning, at 10 o'clock. It continued with unceasing fury, until near one a space of about five hours accompanied with an inundation from the sea. The gale carried with it more violent destruction, than ever I heard of, in any similar calamity, levelled every dwelling with the ground, destroyed all kinds of goods and property and seven lives on the shore. Twenty-five or twenty-six fell of vessels, of all descriptions were stranded and ground on the shoals and reefs; from the vessels 123 lives were lost; seven boats were recovered. One brig, and most of the small craft, may be raised and saved. The limits of a letter will not allow me to give you an account at large, of this dreadful loss."  
In the Political Society lately instituted at Richmond in Virginia, the Federal Constitution was the subject of a public debate. After three evenings spent in discussing it, the Year in favour of it were 128, the No's were only 15. The members of the Society consist of the principal characters in Virginia. The chief speaker against the government was Patrick Henry, Esq.—the principal speaker in favour of it was Mr. Nicholas. It is expected there will be the same majority in favour of the government in the State convention.

ALL persons indebted to the Printer hereof for papers the last year, are requested to make immediate payment—those indebted for advertisements, are also requested to discharge the same.

Ohio Adventurers.  
THOSE who are concerned, for whom the subscribers act as agents, are desired to meet him at Mr. Abiel Plimery's, in Northampton, on Monday the 15th instant, at one o'clock P. M. to agree on a method for obtaining a draught of the first division of land belonging to the Company: also to transact any business which shall be judged necessary, that respects the association.  
It is expected that those who have not paid up the whole which they subscribed for, will come prepared to complete it at the above mentioned day.  
BENY. TUPPER.

February, 1788.  
T A K E N O T I C E I  
THE Subscribers request all persons indebted to them for newspapers, to make immediate payment, otherwise they may expect their papers will be discontinued.  
JOHN CLARKE,  
JOHN PINKS,  
NOTICE is hereby given to the following non-resident proprietors of land in the town of Wendell, that their lands are taxed in a town and highway tax for the year 1788, as follows, viz.

Town tax.	Highway tax.	
	l. s. d.	l. s. d.
Ethan Weatherbee,	1 0 0	4 9 0
Lot No. 35,	1 0 0	4 9 0
Ditto, 36,	2 0 0	3 1 2
Ditto, 37,	2 0 0	3 1 2
Ditto, 38,	2 0 0	3 1 2
Ditto, 39,	2 0 0	3 1 2
Unpaid taxes are paid on or before Tuesday the 15th instant, the much of said land will be sold at public vendue, at the house of John Needham, inholder in said Wendell, at one o'clock P. M. as will be sufficient to discharge the same, with increasing charges. BENNEZER JOHNSON, Constable.		

Wendell, Feb. 1, 1788.  
N O T I C E is hereby given to the following non-resident proprietors of land in the town of Wendell, in the County of Hampshire, that their lands are taxed in a State, Town and County tax for the year 1788, as follows, viz.

State tax.	Town & County tax.	
l. s. d.	l. s. d.	
Lot No. 35,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Ditto, 36,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Jonathan Jackson, Esq. 37,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Thomas Weatherbee,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Ditto,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Ethan Weatherbee,	0 6 0	0 6 0
Dr. Pynchon's heirs, 0 6 0	0 6 0	0 6 0

Unpaid taxes are paid on or before Tuesday the 15th day of February instant, or much of said land will be sold at public vendue, at the house of John Needham, inholder in said Wendell, at two o'clock P. M. as will be sufficient to discharge the same, with increasing charges.  
NATHANIEL JOHNSON, JR. Collector.  
Wendell, Feb. 1, 1788.