

Mr. Printer, IN the present political contest, respecting the establishment of the Federal Constitution, I have been rather a silent spectator...

Emancipation take place, they will be undone, truly wretched enough! So then, if by fraud and violence, I have got the possession of my neighbour's estate, reduced him to misery and slavery, the laws may not restore it to him, the rightful owner again, lest I should be undone. Too weak even for idleness itself. I think upon the whole the article ought to be expunged; or that we ought not to vote to give life to a constitution; which at its first breath will be branded with eternal infamy, by having a stamp of slavery and oppression upon it.

A DEL OS, His Excellency Governor Clinton's Speech, at the opening of the General Assembly of the State of New York.

Gentlemen of the Senate and Assembly, IT being essential to the welfare of our confederacy; that a representation in the national council should be maintained without intermission, and as the term for which the delegates from this state were elected, is expired, you will perceive the necessity of proceeding to an immediate new appointment.

Gentlemen, The requisition for the federal services of the current year, also claims your early attention. I have full confidence, that the same spirit, which has invariably influenced the legislature of this state, will induce you to a cheerful and effectual compliance with every measure founded on the national compact, and necessary to the honour and prosperity of the Union.

It will appear from the act of Congress and other papers on this subject, that the supplies required for the common treasury, are principally to arise from the arrears due on former requisitions: advantages will therefore result from the punctuality of past payments, as a greater proportion of the resources of the state may now be applied to the relief of our own citizens. To assist you in making the necessary arrangements, I shall cause to be laid before you estimates of the public debt, with the receipts and expenditures, since the conclusion of the war, abstracted from the treasurer's annual audited accounts, by which you will be particularly informed of the present state of our treasury.

It gives me great pleasure to inform you, the jurisdiction line between the commonwealth of Massachusetts and this state, which has been so long a subject of controversy, and attended with much inconvenience and distress to the borders, is at length finally adjusted; and that the boundary line between this state and the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is also completed. The reports of the Commissioners employed in these respective transactions, accompanied with maps of the lines, will be delivered to you, in order that the proper directions may be given for their authentication and deposit, and for the final liquidation and settlement of the expenses which have attended these services.

I shall leave with you the several official communications, which have been made to me in the recess; with these you will receive the proceedings of the general convention lately held in the city of Philadelphia, and an act of the United States in Congress, for their transmission to the legislatures of the different states. From the nature of my office you will easily perceive it would be improper for me to have any other agency in the business than that of laying the papers respecting it before you for your information.

Gentlemen, It must afford the highest satisfaction

to observe, under the blessing of heaven, tranquility and good order continue to prevail throughout the state, and that by the industry of the citizens, the country is in a great measure recovered from the wastes and injuries of war. The profuse use, however, of luxuries brought from abroad, drains us of our wealth, and is the source from which most of our present difficulties proceed. I would therefore submit to the wisdom of the legislature, the propriety of limiting the consumption of foreign articles, by encouraging the manufacture of our own productions, as far as may be consistent with our situation, and a due regard to beneficial commerce.

GEORGE CLINTON, Poughkeepsie, Jan. 11, 1788.

WILMINGTON, Jan. 9. On Thursday last, at a meeting of many of the principal inhabitants of this borough, the following resolutions were agreed to and signed:

1st. That from and after the first day of January, 1788, we will kill no lamb for sale or our family use, nor buy any of the same, or suffer it to be bought or used in our families, until the first day of January, 1789.

2d. That on the first day of January next, we will appear in a complete dress of the manufacture of one or more of the United States, at a general meeting to be held on that day.

3d. That we will encourage and promote, as much as we reasonable can, the use of American manufactures, by always giving them the preference to foreign articles, when there is any reasonable proportion between their price and goodness.

A gentleman from the back country informs, that accounts had been received there, that a flat belonging to Kentucky, going down the river, had been sunk by a Spanish vessel, and several of the people killed or drowned; the rest saving themselves by swimming. Soon after a Spanish bateau arrived at Kentucky to purchase flour, when a number of inhabitants in revenge, attacked the Spaniards, killed several, and forced the others to fly. It is apprehended that these quarrels may be attended with serious consequences.

NOTICE is hereby given to the following non-resident proprietor of land in the town of Conway, in the county of Hampshire, that his land is offered in a village, town and state tax; for the year 1779 and 1780, as follows, viz.

Table with 2 columns: Lot No., and Amount. Includes entries for Lot No. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.

Unless said taxes are paid on or before Thursday the 21st of February next, so much of said land will be then sold at public vendue, at the house of Capt. Elias Dickinson, in said Conway, at 4 o'clock P. M. as will be sufficient to discharge the same with intervening charges.

ALEXANDER OLIVER, Collector, Conway, Jan. 7, 1788.

Just Published, and a few Copies for Sale, by the Printer hereof, Mr. ATWATER'S SERMON, at the Ordination of the Rev. JOHN TAYLOR, to the Pastoral Care of the Church in Deerfield.

FOR SALE, at the Printing-Office in Northampton, STRONG'S and BICKERSTAFF'S ALMANACK, For the Year 1788. LIKEWISE, Watt's Psalms, Baron Stubbs's Regulations for the Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Primers, Writing-Paper and Blanks.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. PROCEEDINGS of CONVENTION. (Continued from our last.)

Wednesday, January 16. THE 2d part of the 2d sect. of the 1st art. was read at the table—a diffultory convention entered on the mode of conducting the discussion, it was again agreed, that in debate on any paragraph gentlemen might discuss any other part they might suppose had relation to that under consideration.

Mr. Pierce (from Partridgefield) after reading the 4th sect. wished to know the opinion of gentlemen on it, as Congress appears thereby to have power to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding elections. In respect to the manner, said Mr. P. suppose the legislature of this state should prescribe, that the choice of the federal representatives be, as that of government, a majority of all the votes in the state being necessary to make it such, and Congress should deem it an improper manner, and should order that it be as practised in several of the northern States, where the highest number of votes make the choice, have they not power by this sect. to do so? Again, as to the place, considering Mr. P. may not Congress direct that the election for Massachusetts shall be held in Boston? And if so, is it possible that previous to the election a number of electors may meet, agree upon the eight delegates, and propose the same to a few towns in the vicinity, who, agreeing in sentiment, may meet on the day of election, and carry their list by a major vote. He did not, he said, say that this would be the case; but he wished to know whether it was not a possible one. As the Federal Representatives, who are to form the democratical part of the general government, are to be a check on the representatives of the sovereignty, the Senate, he thought the utmost caution ought to be used to have their elections as free as possible. He observed, that as men have ever been fond of power, we must suppose they ever will continue so—and concluded by observing, that our caution ought in the present case to be greater—as by the proposed constitution qualification of property was required in a Representative—and it might be in the power of some people, thereby to choose a bankrupt for the Representative, in order to give such Representative employment, or that he might make laws favourable to such a description of people. Gen. Porter (from Haverly) endeavoured to obviate the objections of Mr. Pierce, by showing the almost impossibility of Congress making a law whereby eight men could be elected, as Mr. Pierce had supposed—and he thought it equally impossible for the people to choose a person to take care of their property, who had none himself.

Mr. Bishop rose and observed, that by the 4th sect. Congress were enabled to control the elections of Representatives: It has been said, says he, that this power was given in order that the refractory States may be made to do their duty: But if so, Sir, why was it not so mentioned? If that was the intention, he asked why the clause did not run thus, "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state, by the Legislature thereof; but if any state shall refuse or neglect to do so, Congress may, &c. This, he said, would admit of no prevarication. I am, said Mr. B. for giving Congress as much power as possible. It has been said, Mr. President, that the conduct of Rhode-Island in recalling its delegates from Congress, has demonstrated the necessity of such a power being lodged in Congress. I have been informed, by people belonging to Rhode-Island, sir, that that state never has recalled its delegates from Congress—I do not believe it has—and I call on the gentleman who mentioned it, to authenticate his fact.

The Hon. Mr. King rose, & stated the Convention that the state of Rhode-Island did by a solemn resolution, some time since, recall its delegates from Congress.

The Hon. Mr. Gorham confirmed what Mr. King had said, and added, that during the session of the Federal Convention, when seven States only were represented in Congress, application was made by two companies for the purchase of lands, the sale of which would have sunk 7 or 8 millions of dollars, of the continental debt, and that most pressing letters were sent to Rhode-Island to send on its delegates, but that State refused—the consequence was, the contract could not be made.

Mr. Bishop confessed himself convinced of the fact. He proceeded to observe, that if the States should refuse to do their duty, then the power he given to Congress to oblige them to do it. But if they do their duty, Congress ought not to have a power to control elections. In an uncontrolled representation, says Mr. B. lies the security of freedom. And he thought by this clause, that that freedom was forfeited with. In fact, says he, the moment we give Congress this power, the liberties of the yeomanry of this country are at an end. But he trusted they would never give it, and he felt a consolation in the reflection.

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The Hon. Mr. Strong followed Mr. Bishop, and pointed out the necessity there is for the 4th sect. The power, says he, to regulate the elections of federal representatives, must be lodged somewhere; I know of but two bodies wherein it can be lodged—The Legislature of the several States, and the General Congress. If the legislative bodies of the States, who must be supposed to know at what time, and in what place and manner, the elections can best be held, should appoint them; it cannot be supposed that Congress, by the power granted by this sect. will alter them: But, if the legislature of a state should refuse to make such regulations, the consequence will be, that the representatives will not be chosen, and the general government will be dissolved. In such a case, can gentlemen say, that a power to remedy the evil is not necessary to be lodged somewhere? And where can it be lodged, but in Congress? I will consider it an advantage in another respect, we know, sir, that a negligence in the appointment of such, is the characteristic of all parties: In this state, and since the establishment of our present constitution, the first officers of government have been elected by less than one tenth part of their electors in the State. We also know that our town meetings for the choice of officers, are generally attended by an inconsiderable part of the qualified voters. People attend so much to their private interests, that they are apt to neglect this right. Nations have lost their liberties by neglecting their privileges.—Consequently Congress ought to have an interposing power to awaken the people, when thus negligent. Even supposing, sir, the provisional clause suggested by the worthy gentlemen from Norton, should be added—would not Congress then be the judges whether the elections in the several states were constitutional and proper? If so, it will then stand on the same ground it now does.—It appears evident that there must be a general power, to regulate general elections. Gentlemen have said, the proposed constitution was in some places ambiguous—I wish they would point out the particular instances of ambiguity—for my part I think the whole is expressed in the plain common language of mankind.—If any parts are not so explicit as they could be—it cannot be attributed to any design—for I believe a great majority of the men who formed it were sincere and honest men.

Mr. Bishop said the great difficulty with him was, that the power given by the 4th sect. was unlimited; and he did not see that any advantage would arise from its being so.

Mr. Cabot (of Beverly) not having spoke upon the question of biennial elections of representatives, begged leave to revert to that subject, so far as to add to what had been said by others, that we should consider of the particular business which that body will be frequently called upon to transact, especially in the way of revenue; we should consider that on a question of supplies of money to support a war, or purchase a treaty, it will be impossible for these representatives to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of such supplies, until they shall have had time to become acquainted with the general system of federal politics, in its connection or relation to foreign powers—because upon the situation of those must depend the propriety or impropriety of granting supplies: If to this be added a due attention to the exact way of raising such supplies, it must appear, that biennial elections are as frequent as is consistent with the power of the representatives, for the benefit of their constituents.

Mr. C. then turned to the 4th sect. now under debate, and said, it gives me no pain to see the anxiety of different gentlemen concerning the paragraph under consideration, and it evidences a conviction in their minds of what I believe to be true, that a free and equal representation is the best, if not the only, foundation upon which a free government can be built, and consequently that the greatest care should be taken in laying it. I am, sir, one of the people; such I shall continue, and with their feelings I hold, "that the right of electing persons to represent the people in the federal government, is an important and sacred right." The opinions that have been offered upon the manner in which the exercise of this right is provided for by the 4th sect. families me that we are all solicitous for the same end, and that we only differ as to the means of attaining it, and for my own part, I confess that I prize the 4th sect. as highly as any in the constitution: Because I consider the democratical branch of the national government, the branch chosen immediately by the people, as intended to be a check on the federal branch, which latter it is not an immediate representation of the people of America, and is not chosen by them, but is a representation of the sovereignty of the individual States, and its members, delegated by the several State legislatures, and if the State legislatures are suffered to regulate completely the elections of the democratical branch, they may by such an interference first weaken, and at last destroy that check—they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate that control of the general government, which the people ought always to have through their immediate representatives; as one of the people, therefore, I repeat that in my own mind the 4th sect. is to be as highly prized as any in the constitution.

Mr. Parsons contended for the vesting in Congress the powers contained in the 4th sect. not only as those powers were necessary for preserving the union, but also for securing to the people their equal rights of election.—He considered the subject very fully, but we are able to give our readers very imperfectly the heads of his speech. In the Congress, not only the sovereignty of the States are represented in the Senate, but to balance their power, and to give the people a suitable and efficient check upon them, the federal representatives are introduced into Congress: The legislatures of the States are the constituents of the Senate, and the people are the constituents of the Representatives: These two branches, therefore, have different constituents, and as they are designed as natural checks upon each other, and to balance the legislative powers, there will be frequent struggles and contentions between them.—The Senate will wish to control, depress, and render inefficient, the Representatives.—The same disposition in the Representatives towards the Senate, produce the like exertions on their part.—The Senate will call upon their constituents the legislatures for aid.—The Representatives will look up to the people for support. If, therefore, the power of making and altering the regulations defined in this sect. are vested absolutely in the legislature, the Representatives will very soon be reduced to an undue dependence upon the Senate, because the power of influencing and controlling the election of the Representatives of the people, will be exerted without control by the constituents of the Senate. He further observed, that there was much less danger in trusting these powers in Congress, than in the State legislatures. For if the federal representatives wished to introduce such regulations as would secure to them their places, and a continuance in office, the federal Senate would never consent, because it would increase the influence and check of the Representatives; and on the other hand, if the Senate were aiming at regulations to increase their own influence by depressing the Representatives, the consent of the latter never would be obtained, and no other regulations would ever obtain the consent of both branches of the legislature, but such as did not affect their mutual rights and the balance of government, and those regulations would be for the benefit of the people. But a State legislature, under the influence of their senators, who would have their fullest confidence, or under the influence of ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular commotions, and when faction and party spirit run high, would introduce such regulations as would render the rights of the people insecure and of little value. They might make an unequal and partial division of the State into districts for the election of representatives, or they might even disqualify one third of the electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can have no remedy: But the 4th sect. provides a remedy.—A controlling power in a legislature, composed of senators and representatives of

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be evident if we take a short view of our agriculture, commerce and manufactures. Our agriculture has not been encouraged by the imposition of national duties on rural produce: Nor can it be, so long as the several States may take