

A BEGGAR'S professional Advice to his Children on his retiring from Business.

My dear children, THE good success with which it has pleased heaven to bless my industry in this our calling, has given me an opportunity to retire with a handsome fortune, which will be divided among you when I am no more.

Beggars, my dear children, like people of all other professions, live upon the necessities, the passions, or the weaknesses of their fellow creatures.

Be not less friends because you are brothers, or of the same profession; the lawyers herd together in their inns, the doctors in their college, the mercers on Ludgate hill, and the old clothes men in Monmouth street.

Remember this, and always people a whole street with objects skilled in the scenes of different distress, placed at proper distances, the tale that moves not one heart, may surprize the next.

Remember, that when one gives out of pity to you, they give out of kindness to themselves, to rid them of your troublesome application, and for one that gives out of real compassion, five hundred do it out of ostentation.

Remember, that the streets were made for people to walk and not converse in. Keep up their ancient use, and whenever you see two or three gathered together, let them hear not the sound of their own voices till they have bought off the noise of yours.

Trouble not yourself with the nobility, prosperity has made them vain and insensible; they cannot pity what they never can feel; but above all avoid the men in black; the clergy never give, except upon one circumstance only, if you may hit on that you may succeed.

The talkers in the street are to be tolerated on different conditions, and at different prices; if they are tradesmen, their conversation for an end, and may be well paid for by a halfpenny; if an inferior clings to the skirt of a superior, he will give two pence rather than be pulled off; and when you are happy enough to meet a lover and his mistress, never part with them under six pence, for you may be sure they will never part with one another.

So much regard to the necessities of such a man, you must single the great game of all is to be played. However much you are ramble in the day, be sure to have some one street near your shop, where your chief residence is, and all your customers spent; take care that this side of the street is at twelve, in the morning, and at five in the evening.

What should the answer be? "Aye, poor fellow, I know how to pity you in that," and a shilling will be in as much haste to fly out of his pocket, as the hawk from his eye.

Is the maker of a third house sick, way lay his house from morning to night, if he be good for any thing, tell his wife you will play, motions, and night, for his recovery; or if he be as most his husband's eye, tell her you heard the doctor say as he came out that he could not hold it long.

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The danger to which the elements expose them here are too well known, and the greater danger to which they are exposed at home, were any general calamity to involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment only; and it will suffice to make ourselves equal to what they may detach. Even a smaller force than they may detach will be rendered equal, or superior, by the quick-

replicable vessels, which will be repaired, while they wait with them will be repaired, while they wait with them will be repaired.

What this should be, I will not undertake to say. I will only say it should by no means be so great as we are able to make it. Supposing the million of dollars, or 300,000 sterling, which Virginia could annually spare without distress, be applied to the creating a navy.

Allowing eight men, the British average, for every gun, their annual expence, including subsistence, cloathing, pay, and ordinary repairs, would be about two hundred and eighty dollars for every gun, 2,340,000 for the whole.

The following is a copy of a law, that was passed by the legislature of Virginia, Jan. 8, 1788.

AN ACT of the Commonwealth of Virginia, for the punishment of persons guilty of stealing or selling FREE PERSONS as SLAVES.

Whereas several evil disposed persons have seduced and taken the children of black and mulatto free persons, and have actually disposed of the persons so seduced or taken, as slaves, and punished the same, to such crimes not being by law provided for, and offenders being guilty of stealing or selling any free person for a slave, knowing the said person to be free, and therefore shall be lawfully convicted, the person so convicted shall suffer death without benefit of clergy.

And whereas it is the duty of the Legislature to provide for the punishment of such persons, and to prevent the same from being seduced or taken, as slaves, and punished the same, to such crimes not being by law provided for, and offenders being guilty of stealing or selling any free person for a slave, knowing the said person to be free, and therefore shall be lawfully convicted, the person so convicted shall suffer death without benefit of clergy.

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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1788.

NORTHAMPTON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM BUTLER, A FEW RODS EAST OF THE COURT-HOUSE.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION.

(Continued from our last.) WEDNESDAY, January 23, A. M. THE 8th sect. of art. 1st containing the POWERS OF CONGRESS, fill under debate.

Mr. Parsons, (of Newbury-Port) Mr. President. A great variety of supposed objections have been made, against vesting Congress with some of the powers defined in the 8th sect. Some of the objectors have considered the powers as unnecessary, and others, that the people have not the proper security that these powers will not be abused.

It has been objected, that we have not good security against the abuse of power under the new Constitution, as the Confederation gives us. It is my private opinion, that we have a better security. Under the Confederation the whole power, executive and legislative, is vested in one body, in which the people have no representation, and where the States, the great and the small States, are equally represented; and all the checks the States have, it is a power to remove and disgrace an unfaithful servant, after the mischief is perpetrated.

It has been objected, that the senate are made too independent upon the State legislatures. No business under the Constitution of the federal Convention, could have been more embarrassing, than the concluding the senate, as that body must consist of one from each State, and establish and preserve a system of national politics, which we are deprived of, by this Constitution.

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candidate by every elector. That man who acts an honest part to his neighbour, will most probably conduct honourably towards the public.

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The reason why the lords have not this power is founded on a principle in the English constitution, that the commons alone represent the whole property of the nation; and as a money-bill is a grant to the king, none can make the grant but those who represent the property of the nation; and the negative of the lords is introduced to check the profusion of the commons and to guard their own property. The manner of passing a money-bill, is conclusive evidence of these principles:—for after the assent of the lords, it does not remain with the clerk of the Parliament, but is returned to the commons, who by their speaker, present it to the king, as the gift of the commons.—But every supposed controul the senate by this power may have over money-bills, they can have without it, for by private communications with the representatives, they may as well inflit upon an increase of the supplies, or salaries, as by official communications:—But had not the senate this power, the representatives, might tack any foreign matter to a money-bill and compel the senate to concur, or lose the supplies; this might be done in critical seasons, when the senate might give way to the encroachment of the representatives, rather than sustain the odium of embarrassing the affairs of the nation.—The balance between the two branches of the legislature, would in this way be endangered, if not destroyed: and the Constitution naturally injured.

It was objected that by giving Congress a power of direct taxation, we give them power to destroy the State governments by prohibiting them from raising any monies: But this objection is not founded in the Constitution. Congress have only a concurrent right with each State, in laying direct taxes, not an exclusive right; and the right of each State to direct taxation is equally extensive and perfect as the right of Congress—any law, therefore, of the United States for securing to Congress more than a concurrent right with each State, is usurpation and void.

It has been objected that we have no bill of rights.—If gentlemen who make this objection, would consider what are the supposed inconveniences resulting from the want of a declaration of rights, I think they would soon satisfy themselves that the objection has no weight. Is there a singular national right we enjoy, unconcerned by our own legislatures, that Congress can infringe? No one. Is there a singular political right secured to us by our Constitution, against the attempts of our own legislatures, which we are deprived of, by this Constitution? Not one that I recollect. All the rights Congress can controul, we have surrendered to our own legislature, and the only objection, is whether the people shall take from their own legislatures, a certain portion of the federal sovereignty, and unite them in one head, for the more effectual securing of the national prosperity and happiness.

The Hon. Gentleman from Bolton, has stated at large most of the checks, the people have against usurpation, and the abuse of power, under the proposed Constitution: but from the abundance of his matter, he has, in my opinion, omitted two or three, which I shall mention.—The two the several legislative, executive and judicial officers of the several States, take to support the federal Constitution, is as effectual a security against the usurpation of the general government, as it is against the encroachment of State governments. For an increase of the powers by usurpation, is as clearly a violation of the federal Constitution, as a diminution of these powers by private encroachment—and that which obliges the officers of the several States, as rigorously to oppose the one as the other.—But there is another check, founded in the nature of the union, superior to all the parchment checks that can be invented.—If there should be a usurpation, it will not be upon the farmer and the merchant, employed and attentive only to their several occupations, it will be upon thirteen legislatures, completely organized, in full of the confidence of the people, or having the means as well as inclination, successfully to oppose it. Under these circumstances, new but not men would attempt an usurpation.—But Sir, the people themselves have it in their power effectually

supported. The reason why the lords have not this power is founded on a principle in the English constitution, that the commons alone represent the whole property of the nation; and as a money-bill is a grant to the king, none can make the grant but those who represent the property of the nation; and the negative of the lords is introduced to check the profusion of the commons and to guard their own property. The manner of passing a money-bill, is conclusive evidence of these principles:—for after the assent of the lords, it does not remain with the clerk of the Parliament, but is returned to the commons, who by their speaker, present it to the king, as the gift of the commons.—But every supposed controul the senate by this power may have over money-bills, they can have without it, for by private communications with the representatives, they may as well inflit upon an increase of the supplies, or salaries, as by official communications:—But had not the senate this power, the representatives, might tack any foreign matter to a money-bill and compel the senate to concur, or lose the supplies; this might be done in critical seasons, when the senate might give way to the encroachment of the representatives, rather than sustain the odium of embarrassing the affairs of the nation.—The balance between the two branches of the legislature, would in this way be endangered, if not destroyed: and the Constitution naturally injured.

Webster's Institute.