

THOSE who wish to enjoy the blessings of society must be willing to suffer some restraint of personal liberty, and devote some part of their property to the public that the remainder may be secured and protected. The cheapest form of government is not always the best; for parsimony, though it spends little, generally gains nothing. Neither is that the best government which imposes the least restraint on its subjects; for the benefit of having others restrained, may be greater than the disadvantage of being restrained ourselves. That is the best form of government which returns the greatest number of advantages in proportion to the disadvantages with which it is attended. Measured by this rule, the state of New Hampshire cannot expect a Constitution preferable to that now proposed for the union; in point of defence it gives you the force of the whole empire, so arranged as to act speedily and in concert, which is an article of great importance to the frontier states. With the present generation of men, national interest is the measure by which war or peace are determined; and when we see the British nation, by a late treaty paying an enormous annual subsidy to the little principality of Hanover for the purpose of retaining her in military alliance; it should teach us the necessity of those parts in the Constitution, which enable the efficient force of the whole to be opposed to an invasion of any part.

A national revenue and the manner of collecting it is another very interesting matter, and here the citizens of New-Hampshire have better terms offered them, than their local situation can ever enable them to demand or enforce. Import and duties on trade which must be collected in the great importing towns, are the means by which an American revenue will be principally, and perhaps wholly raised. But a point of your state comes near the sea, and that point situated that it never can collect commerce, and become an emporium for the whole state—Nineteen parts in twenty of New-Hampshire are greatly inland, so that local situation necessitates you to be an agricultural people; and this is not a hard necessity if you now form such a political connection with the other states, as will enable you to a just share in that revenue they raise on commerce. New York, the trading towns on Connecticut River, and Boston, are the sources from which a great part of your foreign supplies will be obtained, and where your produce will be exposed for market. In all these places an import is collected, of which as consumers, you pay a share without deriving any public benefit. You cannot expect any alteration in the private systems of these states, unless effected by the proposed government, neither to remedy the evil as you command trade from the natural channels; but must sit down contented under the burden, if the present hour of deliverance be not accepted. This argument alone, if there were no other, ought to decide you in favour of adoption.

It has been said that you object to the number of inhabitants being a ratio to determine your proportion of the national expence—that your lands are poor but the climate favourable to population, which will draw a share of expence beyond your ability to pay. I do not think this objection well founded. Long experience hath taught that the number of industrious inhabitants in any climate is not only the strength, but the wealth of a state, and very justly measure their ability for defraying public expences, without en-

gaging on the necessary support of life. If a great proportion of you lands are barren, you ought likewise to remember another rule of nature; that the population and fertility in any tract of country will be proportioned to each other. Accidental causes for a short time may interrupt the rule, but they cannot be of dangerous continuance. Force may controul in a despotic government, and commerce may interrupt it in an advantageous situation for trade; but from the first of these causes you have no reason to fear, and the last should it happen will increase wealth with numbers.

The fishery is a source and an object of immense consequence to all the eastern coasts. The jealousy of European nations, ought to teach us its value. So far as you become a navigating people, the fishery should be an object of your first attention. It cannot flourish until patronized and protected by the general government. All the interests of navigation and commerce must be protected by the union or come to ruin, and in our present system where is the power to do it. When Americans are debared the fishery, as will soon be the case unless a remedy is provided, all the eastern shores will become miserably poor.

Your forests embosom an immense quantity of timber for ship-building and the lumber trade, but of how little value at present you cannot be ignorant, and the value cannot increase until American navigation and commerce are placed on a respectable footing, which no single state can do for itself—the embarrasments of trade lower the price of your produce, which with the distance of transportation almost absorbs the value; and when by a long journey you have arrived at the place of market, even the freight of your grain will not command cash, at that season of the year most convenient for you to transport. Hence arises that scarcity of specie of which you complain. Your interest is intimately connected with that of the most commercial states, and you cannot separate it. When trade is embarrassed the merchant is the first to complain, but the farmer in event bears more than his share of the loss.

Let the citizens of New-Hampshire candidly consider these facts, and they must be convinced that no other state is so much interested in adopting that system of government, now under consideration.

A. LANDHOLDER.

On QUIETNESS IN BUSINESS.

"Truth of itself is sufficient worth,
Nor needs it glofs of art to set in forth."

AND that ye study to be quiet, and to do your own business, is a most important precept in religion, and absolutely necessary in morals and politics—a precept absolutely reversed by very many in the present day. Ambition and self conceit now lead men to invade and exercise the office of others. The private man assumes the place of statesman, and attempts to deliberate upon and censure the affairs of the publick. The Layman intrudes upon the duties committed to the ecclesiastic, and the suitor at the bar seats himself upon the bench of the judge. Thus all assume powers that do not belong to them, and desert the stations assigned to themselves.

Few Consider the impropriety of their meddling with the business of superiors, advising, blaming, and railing against them, without proper call, and without permission; thus breaking over the bounds of their calling and station, they wrong not only them, but the public, whole interest it is to uphold their power and ref-

erability. We do not consider properly the nature of the thing we meddle with—the real benefits we reap from the man we censure, nor our own incapacity to judge rightly concerning him. If the love of the public good is the cause of our anxiety, yet we ought to restrain ourselves; because to interfere in the affairs of our equals in dignity and merit, is as to controul, check and censure unreasonably, is that species of self conceit, which men call impudence and arrogance.

Some under the pretext of promoting the temporal interest of others, undesign'd and unpermitted, will intrude themselves, and thus cause more vexation and trouble than they make amends for by years of virtuous actions.

Great and cogent ought to be the reasons for meddling with the most indifferent concerns of others, and most vicious conduct as unpolite and unjust. A Friend to Order.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

In the House of Representatives, March 11, 1788.

WHEREAS there are many bonds in the Impost Offices, which were given to secure the import of goods imported into this Commonwealth, before the first day of January 1787, by citizens of other States, which goods were afterwards exported to those States; where the owners lived, and as by the late impost act all goods in like circumstances are exempted from Impost:

Resolved, That all bonds given as aforesaid, be cancelled on satisfactory proof being produced to the Collector of Impost and to the Comptroller General, that the goods mentioned in such bonds were bona fide exported out of this Commonwealth and not reloaded therein.

Sent up for concurrence.
JAMES WARREN, Speaker.

In Senate, March 14, 1788.

Read and concurred.
SAMUEL ADAMS, President.

Approved: JOHN HANCOCK.
A True Copy. Attest.
JOHN AVERY, Jus. Secry.

NOTICE is hereby given to the following non-resident proprietors of land in the town of Ashfield, in the county of Hampshire, that their lands are taxed in the list of 1788, as follows, viz.

Table with columns: State tax, County tax, and names of proprietors including Daniel Alden, Josiah Dickinson, Zebulon Alden, Seth Davenport, Jacob Parsons, John Elwell, Ebenezer Baldwin, William Donisthorpe, Ebenezer Whisman, and Loc No. 23 division.

Rights of undivided land belonging to house lots.

Table with columns: State tax, County tax, and names of proprietors including Loc No. 23 division, 33 division, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59.

Unless full taxes are paid on or before Monday the 15th day of May next, so much of said land with be sold for public vendue, at the house of Seth Ware, landholder in Ashfield, as the said A. M. C. will be sufficient to discharge the taxes, with interest thereon.
JOSEPH WARREN, Constable.
Ashfield, March 24, 1788.

HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1788.

NORTHAMPTON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM BUTLER, A FEW RODS EAST OF THE COURT-HOUSE.

All Persons indebted to

the Printer hereof, for Papers the last year, are again requested to make payment.

PROCEEDINGS of CONVENTION.

(Continued from our last.)
Monday, February 4, 1788.
The general Question in debate.

REV. Mr. Thacher. Mr. President—while the different paragraphs of the proposed Constitution have been debated, I have not troubled this Hon. Convention with any observation of my own upon the subject. Conscious that there were men of deeper political knowledge, and of better abilities than myself, I conceived it my duty to attend their instruction, that having heard with attention, I might decide with integrity. I view the object before us as of greater moment than ever was known within the memory of man, or that hath been recorded by the historian's page. We were, Mr. President, this day to decide on the lives and fortunes of a hundred of the best citizens of this Commonwealth, solemn words that promise to be so much more interesting in the result of the present question, for in this case not a single citizen—not a single State—but a Continent, wide and extended, may be happy or wretched according to our judgment—and posterity will either bless us for laying the foundation of a wise and equal government, or curse us for neglecting their important interests, and forging chains for them, when we declined to wear them ourselves. Having, therefore, as I trust, a full view of the magnitude of the object, I hope I shall be pardoned if I offer my sentiments with freedom. I am sensible of the prejudices that habit against the profession to which I belong. But yet, entrusted by my constituents with so solemn a charge, I think they have a right to expect from me the reasons why I shall finally consent to ratify the proposed form of government.

There are three circumstances which deserve notice in considering the subject. These are, the necessity that all the States have of some general band of union, the checks upon the government in the form offered for our adoption—and lastly, the particular disadvantages to which we shall be exposed if we reject it. With respect to the first of these considerations, I trust there is no man in his senses, but what will own, that the whole country hath largely felt the want of energy in the general government. While we were at war with Britain, common danger produced a common union; but the cause being removed, the effect ceased also. Nay, I do not know, but we may safely add, that that union produced by common danger, was still inadequate to general and national purposes. This Commonwealth, with a generous disinclination regard to the good of the whole appeared foremost in the day of danger. At the conclusion of the late war, two thirds of the continental army were from Massachusetts—their provision and their clothing proceeded all to us in a great measure from our extraordinary exertions. The people did this in the fullest confidence, that when peace and tranquility was restored, from the honour and justice of our filter States, our supererogatory expences would be abundantly repaid. But, alas! How much hath our thoughts been blasted? The Congress, through willing we had no power to do us justice, the number of States increased—their boundaries lessened—their interests clashing! How easily a piece to a foreign power! How liable to war among themselves! Let these arguments be weighed; and I dare say, sir, there is no man but what would consent, that a coercive power over the whole, searching through all parts of the system, is necessary to the preservation and happiness of the whole people.

But I readily grant all these reasons are not sufficient to surrender up the essential liberties of the people. But do we surrender them? This Constitution hath been completed both by its defenders and opponents to the British government. In my view of it, there is a great difference. In Britain the government is said to consist of three forms, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy; but in fact is but a few moves from absolute despotism. In the crown is vested the power of adding at pleasure to the second branch—of nominating all the places

of honour and emolument—of purchasing, by its immense revenues, the suffrages of the house of Commons—the voice of the people is but the echo of the king—and their boasted privileges lie entirely at his mercy. In this proposed form, each branch of power is derived either directly or indirectly from the people. The lower house are elected directly by those persons who are qualified to vote for the representatives of the State; and at the expiration of two years become private men, unless their past conduct entitles them to a future election. The senate are elected by the legislatures of the different States, and represent their sovereignty. These powers are a check on each other, and can never be made either dependent on one another or independent of the people. The president is chosen by electors who are appointed by the people. The high courts of justice arise from the president and senate; but yet the ministers of them can be removed only upon bad behaviour. The independence of judges is one of the most favourable circumstances to public liberty—for when they become the slaves of a venal court, corrupt, and the hirelings of tyranny, all property is precarious, and personal security at an end—a man may be stripped of all his possessions, and murdered with the forms of law. Thus it appears that all parts of this system arise ultimately from the people, and are still independent of each other. There are other restraints, which though not directly named in this Constitution, yet are evidently discerned by every man of common observation. These are, the governments of the several States, and the spirit of liberty in the people. Are we wronged or injured? Our immediate representatives are those to whom we ought to apply—their power and influence will still be great. But should any servants of the people, however eminent their stations, attempt to enslave them, from this spirit of liberty such opposition would arise, as would bring them to the scaffold. But, admitting that there are dangers in accepting this general government; yet are there not greater hazards in rejecting it? Such is, Mr. President, the state of our affairs, that it is not in our power to carve for ourselves. To avoid the greatest and choose the least of two evils, is all that we can do. What then will be the probable effects, if this Constitution be rejected? Have we not reason to fear new commotions in this Commonwealth? If they arise can we be always certain that we shall be furnished with a citizen, who though possessed of extensive influence and the greatest abilities, will make no other use of them, than to quiet the tumult of the people, to prevent civil war, and to restore the usual course of law and justice? Are we not in danger from other states, when their interests and prejudices are opposite to ours? And in some such scenes of hostile contention, will not some Sylla tread the land in blood, or some Cromwell or Caesar lay our liberties prostrate at his feet? Will not foreign nations attack us in our weak, divided condition, and once more render us provinces to some potentate of Europe? Or will those powers to whom we are indebted, be quiet? They certainly will not. They are now waiting for our decision; but when they once see that our union is broken, and that we are determined to neglect them, they will issue our letters of marque and reprisal, and entirely destroy our commerce.

Can the second consideration be sufficient to protect us from foreign enemies, or from disaffection at home? Thirteen States are formed already. The same number are probably to be formed from the lands not yet ceded. Of the former, yet smaller divisions may be made. The province of Maine hath desired a separation; and who knows fine, a separation may take place. Who knows but what the same may happen with respect to the old colony of Plymouth. Now conceive the number of States increased—their boundaries lessened—their interests clashing! How easily a piece to a foreign power! How liable to war among themselves! Let these arguments be weighed; and I dare say, sir, there is no man but what would consent, that a coercive power over the whole, searching through all parts of the system, is necessary to the preservation and happiness of the whole people.

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If this system is broken up, will thirteen or even nine States ever agree to another? And will Providence smile on a people who despise the privileges put into their hands, and who neglect the plainest principles of justice and honesty? After all, I by no means pretend, that there is complete perfection in this proposed Constitution—like all other human productions, it hath its faults—provision is made for an amendment, whenever from practice it is found oppressive. I would add, the proposals which his Excellency hath condescended to lay before this Hon. Convention, respecting future alterations, are real improvements for the better, and we have no reason to doubt that they will be equally attended to by other States, as they lead to common security and preservation.